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1. Introduction
Groundwater forms the invisible, subsurface part of the hydrological cycle, playing a vital role for main-
taining base flows of rivers during the dry seasons. It is also a vital source of water for modern economies, 
accounting for 25% of total water extraction worldwide and a quarter of the irrigation water used to grow 
the world’s food (Aquastat, 2016). Yet, aquifers are being over-exploited at an alarming rate in many regions 
around the world—a situation that is expected to worsen under climate change as recharge rates will be 
increasingly affected (Famiglietti, 2014; Taylor et al., 2013). Groundwater depletion contributes to the deci-
sions by water managers to “close” access to water resources in aquifers and river basins (Molle et al., 2010). 
As societal and environmental needs cannot be met for at least part of the year, water managers must deal 
with complex trade-offs between economic interests, livelihoods, and environmental priorities.
To tackle overexploitation, groundwater management is progressively shifting from an open-access regime 
of water resource extraction to one of regulated access all over the world (Giordano et al., 2009; Shah, 2009). 
Regulated access typically relies on setting a sustainable flow rate or volumetric cap on total water extrac-
tion, and reducing and maintaining extractions at or below that cap (Rinaudo et al., 2020). It can also rely 
on a pigouvian tax or restrictions imposed when sustainability limits are reached (for example, groundwater 
threshold levels). The core issue when closing access to water resources becomes how to best allocate lim-
ited water supplies between competing users, and between users and the environment. It involves setting 
up processes and mechanisms which enable social actors to share water according to a recognized set of 
values and priorities.
Much academic debate has focused on the question of who should control or supervise allocation deci-
sion-making, with no conclusive outcome as to whether state or community approaches are preferable 
(Bruns et al., 2005; Rinaudo et al., 2019). On the one hand, state approaches appear more accountable, but 
they have usually failed to effectively reduce groundwater use to sustainable levels (Molle & Closas, 2020b). 
On the other hand, community approaches appear more legitimate, at least to the regulated. They have 
been most effective where the community had a social basis for collective action, for example a common 
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irrigation infrastructure, or where they face urgent and irreversible threat to their livelihoods (Molle & 
Closas, 2020a; Schlager, 2007).
A more nuanced approach has been called for, in the form of comanagement, whereby responsibilities 
are shared between the state (through e.g., government agencies) and users (through e.g., organizations) 
(Molle & Closas, 2020a). Comanagement sets out to establish institutional arrangements with shared deci-
sion-making powers between the state and users, in order to overcome the weakness of state and user based 
approaches taken individually and maximize synergies (Molle & Closas, 2020a).
Comanagement has been observed in a variety of contexts, some studies highlighting the varying levels 
of shared decision-making that comanagement exhibits in different governance contexts, and factors con-
ducive to a degree of success (Molle & Closas, 2020a). However, the specific institutional arrangements 
supporting comanagement in decision-making over groundwater allocations have not yet been examined 
in detail. How do actors with different social, policy, legal, and cultural conditions and different histories set 
out such institutional arrangements? How do they share power over allocation decisions? What system of 
rules and instruments can guarantee effective, efficient and fair decisions and outcomes (Schlager, 2007)? 
This paper aims to examine this diversity in institutional design, in particular by presenting the variety of 
ways that authority between governments and users can be shared within institutional arrangements.
To illustrate this diversity, three cases, France, California, and Spain, were selected as they share a com-
mon strive to move from open access toward regulated extraction in agriculture using comanagement 
arrangements. In particular, all three cases impose the creation of user organizations to better regulate 
groundwater extractions. At the same time, legislators of the three countries made fundamentally different 
choices regarding institutional arrangements for comanagement and the relative role of the state an users’ 
organizations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next sections present the theoretical framework 
used to examine the France, California, and Spain cases, followed by a brief background on each case to out-
line the rationale for choosing these cases, before delving into the details of their institutional arrangements 
influencing groundwater allocation.
2. Groundwater Allocations of Groundwater Rights in Agriculture
2.1. Approaches to Groundwater Allocation in Agriculture
Four general approaches to allocating water resources in agriculture can be contrasted. First, allocations 
can be made (and if necessary adjusted over time) through administrative procedures, such as a permitting 
regime, managed by public authorities. Second, allocations can be made through court adjudication where 
a judge mediates the allocation process. Third, water can be allocated by agricultural users themselves based 
on collectively agreed rules, for instance by a group of farmers in collective irrigation systems. Fourth, allo-
cations can be based on market mechanisms, for example when water use rights are made tradable or when 
charges and tariffs are applied to influence water use (Dinar et al., 1997; Rey et al., 2018). It is important to 
note that, in any groundwater resource setting, different allocation mechanisms may co-exist, for example, 
when a State based permitting system and a trading scheme are used in combination to manage groundwa-
ter resources.
Each approach is embedded in contrasting ideas of what counts as legitimate and accountable decisions. 
Allocations made by administrations are deemed legitimate when State decisions aim at balancing interests 
between different social groups (distributive justice). In contrast, the legitimacy of decisions made through 
adjudication derives from their accountability through a transparent and legalistic approach supervised by 
the judiciary. The involvement of users may be justified for procedural reasons (social justice), while market 
mechanisms are deemed justified when they contribute to maximize economic efficiency.
Each allocation approach (administrative, legalistic, user-based, market) accentuates the role of different 
social actors in allocation decisions. User-based and market-based allocation systems put more authority 
on appropriators of the groundwater resource, while administrative and legalistic ones defer authority to 





may be designed to increase the role of specific social actors, for example when public authorities establish 
participative processes to inform or influence allocation decisions.
2.2. Examining Agricultural Groundwater Allocations Through the “Bundle of Rights” 
Framework
The four approaches described above provide a general picture of how allocation decisions can be made, but 
they do not describe well how authority can be shared in the process of allocating groundwater. To examine 
more closely how authorities and users share authority over groundwater allocations, it is useful to take a 
closer look at the different elements that constitute the right to use groundwater for agricultural purposes. 
To do so, it we look more closely at the definition of “groundwater rights,” and more specifically the concept 
of property rights attached to groundwater.
In this paper, we adopt the conceptual framework developed by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) which is par-
ticularly relevant in the case of common property goods. It diverges from the commonly held view by econ-
omists that a property right is about having an “exclusive and unalienable right over something”. Instead, it 
borrows from the legal tradition of property law, the view that property is not merely ownership of things 
(i.e., the relationships between owners and “things”) but it is a set of legal relationships among people 
(Johnson, 2007). In other words, a right to use a natural resource is not an absolute and unlimited right, 
but it stems from a particular web of social relations that legitimize access and withdrawal of that natural 
resource. It is the “power to take particular actions,” and that power is limited by institutions, that is rules set 
by social actors such as state administrations or groups of resource appropriators.
Property rights are thus conceptualized as a “bundle of rights,” independent of each other, but that can be 
held cumulatively. For each right that a social actor holds, formal and informal rules exist that authorize or 
require actions relating to the exercise of this right. Only the holder of the complete set of rights possesses 
the authority akin to those imagined in classical economics.
Schlager and Ostrom’s “bundle of rights” framework differentiates between five components of a property 
right over a natural resource (Table 1). If we apply that framework to groundwater, access rights refer to 
the authority to create or operate a well, or connect to an existing infrastructure distributing groundwater. 
Withdrawal rights relate to the authority to extract groundwater. Management rights refer to the authority 
to design rules that determine how water can be extracted and how compliance with those rules will be en-
sured. Exclusion rights refer to the authority to determine who can access (or not) groundwater resources. 
And finally, alienation rights refer to the authority to sell, lease and transfer all previous rights. The rights 
of access and withdrawal are also called operational rights by Schlager and Ostrom (1992), while the three 




Type of rights Definition applied to groundwater allocations
Operational rights
 Access right The authority to create a well/borehole or to connect to an existing infrastructure 
extracting and distributing groundwater
 Withdrawal right The authority to extract groundwater
Collective choice rights
 Management right The authority to design rules specifying how groundwater can be extracted as well as 
rules ensuring compliance from users
 Exclusion right The authority to decide who can access groundwater
 Alienation right The authority to sell, lease or transfer groundwater operational and management rights
Table 1 
The Bundle of Rights Over Groundwater Use in Agriculture (Modified From Mongruel et al., 2019)
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2.3. Sharing “Rights” Over Groundwater Allocations
In the “bundle of rights” perspective, property rights are viewed as relative and shared between actors 
(Orsi, 2013). Social actors intervening in the definition and exercise of groundwater rights for agriculture 
are numerous: state or local regulatory agencies, landowners, tenants, or individual water users (e.g., busi-
nesses, corporations), communities or groups of individuals (i.e., user organizations). We can illustrate the 
variety of ways these actors share power by looking specifically at the sharing of operational and collective 
choice groundwater rights (Figure 1).
The rights to access and withdraw can be held individually by landowners or farmers drilling a borehole and 
extracting groundwater for their own purposes. Alternatively, groups of groundwater users may collectively 
hold a common access and extraction right. Those rights can also be hold and managed administratively 
by the State.
In a pure state-controlled system, the five rights will be held by a state agency, such as a basin authority 
with no user involvement. In contrast, in a pure privately controlled system, the five rights would be held by 
landowners or farmers, with no oversight by public authorities or communities over where, when, by whom 
and how groundwater is appropriated by, and exchanged between, users. In a pure community controlled 
system, the rights would be held by a community organization such as a water user organization, with no 
individual appropriation of any of the five rights.
In a comanagement setting, components of the bundle of rights can be shared in different ways between 
users and the state. For instance, the State may control management rights, placing spatial and temporal 
restrictions on the amount of groundwater that can be extracted to ensure long term sustainability, while 
users (organized in organizations) may still hold the right over who can access and extract groundwater (i.e., 
alienation and exclusion rights).
In other cases, alienation right might be also held by the State or by water user organizations. This would 
imply that individual users would not be allowed to bequeath, sell or temporary lease their withdrawal 
rights to a prospective user without authorization by the State or the water user organization. The State or 
water user organization may even hold the exclusive power.
The following section presents a short overview of groundwater management in France, Spain, and Califor-




Figure 1. Sharing groundwater rights: An illustration of possible governance arrangements.
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3. Groundwater Management in France, Spain, and California: Context
A wide diversity of institutional design options exist around the world for ensuring sustainable ground-
water extraction and allocating groundwater (OECD, 2017). However, only a few clearly set out to tackle 
over-extraction of groundwater resources while simultaneously encouraging comanagement between the 
State and users (Molle & Closas, 2020a). This paper focuses on three cases, that is France, Spain, and Cali-
fornia, which, in recent years, have moved toward more holistic and participatory sustainable groundwater 
management planning.
In both France and Spain, the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) adopted in 2000, complemented by 
the Groundwater Directive (2006) imposes to achieve good quantitative and chemical status of groundwater 
bodies. Reaching good quantitative groundwater status means avoiding depletion, intrusion of low water 
quality from surface, costal or other groundwater body as well as maintaining groundwater-surface water 
flows to avoid any significant diminution in the ecological status of surface waters and groundwater-de-
pendent ecosystems (Klove et al., 2011). Public authorities were tasked to prepare River Basin Management 
Plans (RBMPs) to achieve WFD environmental objectives by 2015, and at the latest by 2027.
In California, the 2014 Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) has the objective to achieve 
groundwater sustainability in prioritized groundwater basins by avoiding “undesirable results,” that is 
groundwater overdraft, groundwater storage reduction, saltwater intrusions, depletions of interconnected 
surface waters that impact beneficial uses of surface waters, land subsidence and water quality degrada-
tions. Of the state’s 517 groundwater basins, 109 basins have been prioritized. Within these areas, the State 
required the formation of local Groundwater Sustainability Agencies (GSAs), enthrusted with the respon-
sibility of preparing and implementing Groundwater Sustainability Plans (GSPs) to achieve groundwater 
sustainability (e.g., the avoidance of undesirable results) within a 20-year window. In contrast to the WFD, 
SGMA does not require restoring groundwater basins; it only aims to avoid further deterioration based on 
conditions as they existed in January 2015.
These ambitious policy targets must account for complex legal traditions regarding groundwater appro-
priation. Until the late 20th century, groundwater in France, Spain, and California was mostly left to land-
owners’ appropriation. With its 1985 Water Law, Spain was first to change this situation by including all 
groundwater in the public domain. France did not make its groundwater public; instead, the 1992 French 
Water Act affirmed that water was the “common heritage of the Nation,” seemingly placing water into the 
category of “common” good. Groundwater in California is entrusted to the State for the people of the State. 
Users may establish the right to use water—subject to California constitutional limitation of reasonable use 
and avoidance of waste.
Table 2 presents some key physical, socio-economic, and institutional background information on the three 
countries. Considering these recent policy and legal developments, the next section examines in more detail 
how public authorities and groundwater users exercise authority over the “bundle of rights”.
4. Examining the Bundles of Groundwater Rights in France, Spain, and 
California
4.1. France
In France, groundwater access rights are regulated under both the mining and the environment codes. A 
permit is requested for drilling the well (mining code), which is in general automatically granted, after a 
“declaration” to the State, except if the proposed well is located in a drilling restriction area (for instance an 
area protected for water supply). The environment code also requires a pumping permit for the installation 
of the pumping device itself (Rinaudo, 2020). The pumping permit, which defines a maximum pumping 
flow rate, is only necessary if the capacity of the pump exceeds 8  m3/h. The permit is obtained after a 
“declaration” to the State, if the maximum anticipated annual extraction (based on the capacity to pump) 
is below 200,000 m3. A more complex authorization process that assesses the potential impact of the with-
drawal on third parties and on the environment is required if the pumping capacity is above 200,000 m3. It 
is important to note that the “declaration” process does not automatically authorize the well. The State can 





the declaration. No new pumping permit will be issued if the basin is declared fully allocated by the State. 
No time limit exists on these permits, but they can be canceled without compensation when justified for 
reasons of overriding public interest.
Withdrawal rights are regulated under a series of water laws developed over the last 50 years that gradually 
strengthened requirements for obtaining a permit to extract water (Rinaudo, 2020). Metering of extractions 
is compulsory under the 1992 Water Law. An annual extraction permit is required if annual extraction ex-
ceeds 10 000 m3. Lower extraction thresholds (i.e., 1,000 m3) are implemented in specific protection zones, 
such as catchments and aquifers which are classified as having a structural water deficit (i.e., called “re-
stricted” areas or i.e., “Zone de Restriction des Eaux”), in alluvial aquifers closely linked with surface water, 
in ecologically sensitive areas, and in areas protected for drinking water production. All extraction permits 
include an annual maximum extraction volume, sometimes broken down seasonally or monthly. Permits 
have a 1-year validity and are almost systematically renewed.
In overexploited basins (i.e., “restricted” areas), withdrawal rights are further constrained to ensure the 
reaching of sustainable extraction caps. Under the 2006 Water Act, Sustainable Extraction Limits (SELs) 
must be defined in volume and withdrawal permits granted to users must be adjusted to meet that limit. 
SELs are defined to ensure the achievement of the environmental objectives of the WFD (see Section 3). 
In overexploited basins, farmers no longer obtain an individual extraction permit and instead receive a 
notification from an agricultural water user collective organization called OUGC. The OUGC holds a 15-
year bulk extraction permit on behalf of all farmers extracting in the same hydrological unit (Rouillard & 
Rinaudo, 2020).
Collective choice rights over management and exclusion are held collectively in a nested framework. At 
the catchment level, Local Water Commissions (LWCs) composed of representatives of the State, local gov-
ernments and all users participate to the development of catchment management plans which set SEL and 
specify how this limit is apportioned between agriculture, urban water supply and industry (Rinaudo, 2020).
In unrestricted basins where water resources have not yet been fully allocated, the State retains manage-
ment and exclusion rights. Individual permits are issued to each claimant. In overexploited basins classified 
as “restricted areas,” management and exclusion rights over the allocations to agriculture are transferred 
to the OUGC. The OUGC has authority over how the bulk volume will be shared on an annual basis be-






 Average annual rainfall (mm) 900 636 530
 Total agricultural area (million ha) 29 17 17
 Total irrigated land (million ha) 2 3,35 4
 Water extraction for irrigation 
(km3)
3 17 35




 Number of farm businesses 515,000 1 million 80,000
Institutional
 Key groundwater legislation on 
quantitative management
1964 Water Act: 1992 Water Act; 2003 
amendment (transposition of the 
EU WFD) 2006 Water Act
1985 Water Act; 2003 amendment 
(transposition of the EU WFD) 
2001 Water Act
1992 GMA (AB 3030); 2002 
modifications to GMA (SB 1938); 
2014 SGMA; 2016 AB 1390 and 
SB 226
 Permitting regimes on 
groundwater extraction
Yes (national) Yes (river basin level) No
Table 2 
Key Physical, Socio-Economic and Institutional Characteristics of Selected Cases
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with sustainable extraction limit set at the basin level by the Local Water Commission. Hence, through the 
OUGC, farmers collectively agree on how the volume dedicated to agriculture should be shared among 
themselves. They also can define criteria authorizing new wells and can recommend the closure or substi-
tution of specific wells. The State retains a close oversight by validating the rules developed by the OUGC 
and the annual allocation plan.
State control over allocations is further reinforced through another regulatory instrument created by the 
1992 Water Act which offers the possibility to impose temporary restrictions during drought. Restrictions 
apply on groundwater extraction in order to ensure minimum aquifer levels and river flows, defined as 
the levels that ensure sufficient water is available for environmental flows and “priority” uses (e.g., drink-
ing water, national defense infrastructure, fire services). However, restrictions are not the sole decision of 
the State, but follows a pre-design emergency plan co-developed and co-implemented with water users in 
drought committee groups. Hence, management rights over drought restrictions are shared between very 
different types of users.
Acces and extraction permits associated with the well are legally not transferable with market mechanisms 
in France (Hé rivaux et al., 2020). They are generally transferred with the land, by decision of the local ad-
ministration. Thus, the value of the groundwater access and extraction rights is included in the price set for 
land transaction, meaning that there is an implicit market for groundwater. However, in restricted areas, the 
users’ organization (OUGC) needs to approve (and can oppose to) the decision to transfer water extraction 
rights with land. In that case, no compensation to the former beneficiary is required.
In restricted areas, the OUGC, as the holder of the bulk extraction permit, is free to develop its own rules 
to reallocate water on an annual basis, for instance based on meteorological and hydrological conditions, 
or on yearly requests by farmers within their management area. OUGC have developed a wide variety of 
allocation rules (Rouillard & Rinaudo, 2020). No specific legal obligations exist, except that OUGC decisions 
must be transparent and reflect a fair and equal treatment of all users in its reallocation decisions.
Table 3 presents a summary of the procedures and requirements adopted in France around the five ground-
water “rights.”
4.2. Spain
Rights to access groundwater in Spain have changed little since the 1879 Water Law, which granted ground-
water access rights to landowners. From 1934, access rights are limited by a permitting regime requiring 
farmers to obtain a permit to drill or dig wells from River Basin Authorities (RBAs), known as Confedera-
ciones Hidrologicas.
Regarding withdrawal rights, since the 1985 Water Act, new users pumping above 7,000 m3/year requires 
concessions for private use of a public good. Existing groundwater users prior to the 1985 Water Law had a 
period to either register their historical right as public (concession) for 50 years (Registry of public waters) 
or keep it as private in perpetuity (Catalog of private waters). However, the right, if held private, cannot be 
modified: a request to deepen the well or increase the volume extracted would transform the private right 
into a concession under the public regime.
RBAs manage the Catalog and Registry of Public Waters under the 1985 Water Act. The volume of water 
associated to the concession or private right during registration was dependent on rules established by each 
RBAs. For example, in the Jucar river basin located in the central-eastern part of the Iberian Peninsula, 
water rights older than 1985 obtained 5,800 m3/ha for summer crops and 4,000 m3/ha for spring crops. 
Concessions granted between 1986 and 1997 were then allocated 4,000 m3/ha. Since 1997, no new author-
izations are granted.
Management and exclusion rights are controlled by RBAs. The 1985 Water Law also gave the RBAs enforce-
ment authority to control groundwater use and impose sanctions for illegal wells and excessive extractions. 
However, this authority is limited in reality because of the lack of monitoring and control (AEVAL & Rin-








Type of right Nature of right Owner of right Description
Access right •  An authorization to drill a well
•  A pumping authorization, 
specifying a maximum pumping 
flow rate.
•  Valid in perpetuity
•  Can be revoked by administrative 
decision, leading to well closure 
(without compensation)
•  Landowners  General situation: The user submits an individual 
application (no publicity requirement). The 
State agency must verify the absence of impact 
of the proposed pumping on third parties (incl. 
environment). The impact assessment procedure 
is simplified if annual abstraction is less than 
200.000 m3. Pumping of less than 10.000 m3/year 
are exempted. Existing users are not given the 
opportunity to oppose to the delivery of a new 
authorization.
 In restricted basins: Exemptions only applied to 
pumping of less than 1.000 m3/year. No new 
authorization granted if fully allocated (withdrawal 
right)
Withdrawal right •  An individual annual withdrawal 
authorization, specifying a 
maximum volume that can 
be pumped during a season 
(sometimes per month)
•  Validity: 1 year, renewable
•  Landowners
•  OUGC in priority basins
 General situation: The State agency grants the volume 
requested after verifying the absence of impact 
on third parties/environment (the environmental 
impact assessment usually has to be performed 
when granting an access right).
 In restricted basins: Farmers apply each year for 
authorization to pump water to OUGC. The OUGC 
compiles requests and adjusts individual ones 
as necessary to meet SEL. The OUGC sends the 
allocation plan to the State agency, which notifies 
extraction authorization to each farmer.
Management right •  Right to define SEL at catchment 
and aquifer level
•  Right to apportion SEL among 
economic sectors
•  Local Water Commission, 
composed of representatives of all 
users, local government and state 
agencies
 General situation: No definition of SEL by the local 
water commission
 In restricted basins: The Local Water Commission 
defines the SEL. It allocates the SEL between 
the drinking water sector, industrial use and 
agriculture. SELs can be defined at the level of sub-
catchment and other coherent hydrological units.
•  Right to set limits on extractions 
by individual agricultural user
•  Up to 15 years
•  In non-restricted basins: The State
•  In restricted basins: OUGC
 General situation: Only the State Agency can reduce 
individual authorizations of farmers.
 In restricted basins: Farmers form an OUGC which 
is in charge of designing a water sharing plan. 
This plan, which specifies a spatial distribution 
of individual extraction limits is submitted to the 
State Agency specifying a spatial distribution of 
individual extraction limits, accompanied with 
an environmental impact assessment. The State 
Agency grants a bulk withdrawal authorization 
to this OUGC for up to 15 years. OUGC annually 
adapts the allocation within limits specified in 
the bulk authorization and submits it to the State 
Agency for approval.
•  Right to temporarily restrict 
extractions during a drought
•  State, with consultation of 
representatives of users in the 
basin in drought committee groups
 Minimum river and aquifer flows are defined as the 
levels that ensure sufficient water is available for 
environmental flows and “priority” uses (e.g., 
drinking water, national defense infrastructure, fire 
services). Pre-defined restrictions are phased in as 
water levels reach pre-defined thresholds
Table 3 
Characteristics of Groundwater Rights in France
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Users organization can be involved in the exercise of management and exclusion rights. Most user organ-
izations in Spain organization were established for the collective management of irrigation networks sup-
plied by groundwater. Under the 1985 Water Act (modified in 2001), groundwater user organizations must 
be created when the aquifer has been declared overexploited or where groundwater bodies are at risk of 
not meeting WFD objectives, in which their main role is the collective management of the overexploited 
aquifer. It then becomes mandatory to integrate all users extracting from the same aquifer into a single 
groundwater user organization.
The groundwater user organization supervises the implementation and effective control of the extraction 
plan prepared with supervision from RBAs. Example cases include the Groundwater User Organizations for 
the Western and Eastern Mancha and the Campo de Montiel. Some groundwater user organizations have 
been created without a legal imperative, such as the groundwater user organization of the Eastern Mancha, 
as a collective effort to stop the deterioration of the resource and to avoid the administrative declaration as 
an overexploited aquifer (Custodio et al., 2017; López-Gunn, 2012).
The groundwater exploitation plan can set out measures to reduce annually individual extraction limits 
associated with concessions and private rights to meet a sustainable extractable volume where the aquifer 
is declared overexploited or where water bodies are at risk of not meeting WFD objectives. A program with 
actions for the recovery of the good status of the water body has to be approved and included within the 
program of measures of the River Basin Management Plans. The action program will order the extraction 
regime to achieve a rational exploitation of resources in order to achieve a good status of groundwater 
bodies, and protect and improve associated ecosystems. This can include prohibition of drilling new wells 
(i.e., stricter control of access rights), banning the issuance of any new concessions (i.e., stricter control on 
extraction rights), or temporary volumetric restrictions applied to all individual wells.
The annual extraction restrictions have been usually set as a common percentage of reduction over the 






Type of right Nature of right Owner of right Description
Exclusion right •  Right to declare basin closure (i.e., 
definition of restricted area)
•  State  The State declares basin closure on the basis of 
hydrological studies showing the long term 
imbalance between renewable resource and 
extraction, taking into account environmental 
flows. The declaration is made in coherence with 
the relevant River Basin Management Plans and 
the objectives of the WFD.
•  Right to include a new agricultural 
user
•  In unrestricted basins: The State
•  In restricted basins: OUGC
 General situation: The State accepts new users until 
the basin is fully allocated. It works on a first, 
come, first served basis
 In restricted basins: The OUGC sets out rules to accept 
new users. In some OUGC, no new users are 
accepted if the basin is fully allocated. In others, 
individual extraction limits are reduced to allow 
the introduction of new users.
Alienation right •  Right to transfer well and pumping 
authorization
•  Right to transfer withdrawal right
•  In unrestricted basins: landowners, 
with approval by the State
•  In restricted basins: Landowners, 
with approval of OUGC
 General situation: Well, pumping and extraction 
authorizations are usually transferred 
automatically through land sells. However, the 
State can oppose and cancel the transfer of the 
authorization. No temporary (annual) transfer 
occur between individual user. No permanent or 
temporary trading is possible.
 In restricted basins: The OUGC must also approve 
the permanent transfer through land sells of well, 
pumping and extraction authorizations. Each year, 
the OUGC can reallocate volumes from extraction 
authorizations between individual beneficiaries.
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exploitation plan for Mancha Oriental for year 2007, during a severe phase of a multiannual drought). Addi-
tional temporary restrictions can also apply within any one year in the case of seasonal droughts, as regulat-
ed under drought management plans (“Planes Especiales de Sequias”). The drought plans use basin-specific 
state indexes computed as weighted average of relevant observed variables at selected control points, for 
example precipitation, streamflow, reservoir level, and groundwater level (Estrela & Vargas, 2012; Zanio-
lo et al., 2018) to trigger water demand and supply measures when entering a drought period (Carmona 
et al., 2017).
The concessions for irrigation can be legally reviewed and reduced in cases where it is proven that the needs 
of the concession holder can be fulfilled with a lesser endowment or a more efficient use of the resources, 
which contributes to conserving groundwater resources. For these purposes, RBAs can carry out audits 
and controls of the concessions, in order to verify the efficiency of the management and use of the water 
resources object of the concession. However, in practice, there are very few cases where authorities have 
reduced concessions permanently.
Alienation, access and extraction rights can only be transferred permanently from one user to another 
through a change in landownership. The total volume attached to a concession can be reduced by 50% dur-
ing land transaction if the aquifer is declared over-exploited or the exploited groundwater body is at risk of 
failing WFD objectives. The 1999 Water Act allows concession holders to enter into contracts to temporarily 
transfer withdrawal rights to land other than stated in the concession to be irrigated.
Table 4 presents the procedures and requirements adopted in Spain around the five groundwater “rights.”
4.3. California
As in France and Spain, the right to build a well or obtain a well in California has historically been linked 
to landownership. Permits are required to build, modify, or deconstruct a well in California, and are issued 
by local counties. Moreover, a 2018 California court decision held that counties have a duty to consider the 
public trust before authorizing the drilling of groundwater wells that could adversely impact surface flows 
(a public trust resource).
Regarding groundwater withdrawal rights, there is no state permit system for withdrawing groundwater in 
California and landowners are generally not required to obtain a permit (Nelson & Perrone, 2016; Stanford 
University, 2020), unlike Spain and France. Importantly, groundwater use rights are implicit, until there is 
cause to define groundwater pumping rights such as in a court adjudication (see below). Therefore, in the 
absence of a court decree defining pumping rights or a local or a state regulation governing groundwater 
use, groundwater users can drill and pump water as they like.
Groundwater priorities of use have been developed though a relatively small number of California Supreme 
Court cases over many decades. Generally speaking, overlying landowners have priority to pump ground-
water and put it to beneficial use without State or court approval. This right is a “correlative” or shared right 
meaning that all overlying landowners have equal rights to groundwater in the basin and, when there is 
insufficient water for overlying users, cutbacks are shared across users.
If the basin is deemed to have surplus groundwater, non-overlying users can claim appropriative rights, 
but they remain inferior to landowners’ rights. Appropriative rights are themselves prioritized according 
to level of seniority (prior-appropriation). However, a third class of rights, called prescriptive water rights, 
can realign these priorities, making it possible to obtain superior appropriative rights through prescription 
(Garner et al., 2020). A prescriptive water right is acquired through adverse possession of someone else's 
water right (i.e., when the basin is in overdraft) when the use is actual, open, and notorious, hostile, and 
adverse to the original owner, continuous, and uninterrupted for the statutory period of five years, and 
under a claim of right.
However, governance over control access and withdrawal rights has evolved over time, most recently cul-
minating with the passage of SGMA. SGMA requires prioritized basins to establish GSAs and develop GSPs 
that present measures to protect the basin from “undesirable” conditions, defined through “minimum 
thresholds” for specific parameters, such as aquifer levels. Under SGMA, any local public agency with water 








Type of right Nature of right Owner of right Description
Access right •  A permit authorizing the 
construction of a well or borehole.
•  Valid in perpetuity.
•  Non revocable
•  Landowner, an irrigation 
organization (“Comunidad de 
regantes”) or any petitioner 
accrediting that he has the 
agreement of the holders who met 
at least half of the surface of these 
lands
Withdrawal right Private historical water rights 
(granted before 1985 Water 
Law)
•  No pumping limit for landowner, 
besides considerations on 
pumping distance among wells.
•  Valid in perpetuity. Non 
modifiable.
• Concessions (granted after 1985 
Water Law)
•  Specifies a maximum annual 
& monthly volume that can be 
extracted, a maximum pumping 
flow rate; the intended use of 
water.
•  Valid for 50 years. Non revocable
•  Can be modified (reduced) in 
overexploited aquifers
•  Landowner, an irrigation 
organization (“Comunidad 
de regantes) or any claimant 
accrediting that he has the 
agreement of the holders who met 
at least half of the surface of these 
lands
 Since 1986, all new prospective users required to 
obtain a permit
 Below 7,000 m3 a year: No concession required 
Above 7,000 m3 a year: Concession to be obtained 
from the river basin authority
 Some existing users have kept non-revocable but 
non-modifiable private extraction rights based on 
historical use
 Some existing users have opted for revocable but 
modifiable permit
 Concessions specify the maximum annual volume 
granted, maximum monthly volume where 
appropriate, and maximum instantaneous flow 
(m3/s), for a certain use
 Withdrawal right can be reduced if full allocation 
not used for more than three consecutive years 
(“use it or lose it”)
Management right •  Right to set extraction limits, 
accounting for environment 
protection
•  RBAs, jointly with groundwater 
user organization
 The 1985 Water Act provided additional authority to 
RBAs to modulate access and withdrawal rights. 
The river basin management plans (“Planes 
Hidrologicos de cuenca”) can impose annual limits 
on withdrawal rights of both concession holders and 
private water right holders through groundwater 
abstraction plans (“Planes de Explotación”). The 
declaration of aquifer overexploitation, or of water 
bodies at risk of being at risk of not meeting WFD 
objectives, can result in stricter measures. Where 
the aquifer is declared overexploited or where water 
bodies are at risk of not meeting WFD objectives, 
authorities can reduce concessions and private 
rights to meet the sustainable extractable volume. In 
that case, a groundwater user organization has to be 
conformed within 6 months.
•  Right to design and implement 
specific measures in times of 
crises (drought)
•  RBAs, jointly with groundwater 
user organization
•  Right to enforcing rules and apply 
sanctions
•  RBAs and Groundwater user 
organizations (GWUAs)
 General cases: RBAs have enforcement authority to 
control groundwater uses and impose sanctions for 
illegal wells and excessive abstractions.
 Over-exploited basins: Groundwater user 
organizations can impose sanctions on their 
members (e.g., Mancha Oriental, Western Mancha)
Table 4 
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districts, resource conservation districts, and water conservation districts. Local control was heavily empha-
sized in the legislation and gave basins the ability to form any number of GSAs so long as all areas within 
the basin were represented. This has resulted in the formation of more than 260 GSAs in over 140 basins 
(SWRCB, 2020).
In GSPs, GSAs can adopt a wide range of measures to achieve sustainability goals, such as rules and regula-
tions on the creation of wells (e.g., spacing requirements), limits or suspension of groundwater extractions, 
measurement and reporting requirements, imposition of fees on groundwater extraction, enforcement and 
sanctions. Although GSAs are provided powers to control groundwater extractions, the legislation also 
states that decisions made under SGMA cannot determine or alter groundwater use rights. The implications 
of this seemingly contradictory language will likely need further interpretation, an action that will most 
likely play out in the courts (Babbitt et al., 2017).
SGMA presents a unique alternative framework to purely top down or bottom-up governance by empow-
ering local agencies with the authority and responsibility to manage groundwater resources, with oversight 
and enforcement authority afforded to the state as a means to ensure sustainability goals are met (Kiparsky 
et al., 2017). The State Department of Water Resources is tasked with reviewing GSPs and plays a support 
role in SGMA implementation by providing statewide technical and financial assistance (e.g., grant pro-
grams and facilitation services) to GSAs.
The State has kept its intervention to the minimum, although it has created the possibility to intervene 
substantially if locals are unable or unwilling to sustainably manage their basin. The State Water Resources 
Control Board is authorized to step in to protect groundwater resources when a basin is designated “proba-
tionary” because the proposed GSP is unlikely to lead to meeting SGMA targets. In this way, state author-
ities work as a credible threat to local users: if they cannot compromise, the State may impose unwanted 
restrictions and can impose fees to recover the cost incurred in administering a probationary basin.
While SGMA is the state’s most comprehensive groundwater legislation passed to date, other authorities 
and laws developed prior to SGMA continue to have influence over control access and withdrawal rights 
across the state.
For example, prior to the passage of SGMA, the main institutional arrangements devised to regulate ground-
water access and withdrawal could take different approaches (Langridge, Sepaniak, & Conrad, 2016). A 
particular type of district could be established to control some aspect of groundwater, for instance when 






Type of right Nature of right Owner of right Description
Exclusion right •  Right to declare basin closure 
(i.e., definition of overexploited 
aquifer/at risk of failing WFD 
objectives)
•  RBAs  RBAs declare aquifers as overexploited.
•  Right to accept new agricultural 
users
•  RBAs  General case: no specific limit
 Overexploited aquifers: Authorities can block all 
new groundwater abstraction concessions
Alienation right •  Right to transfer well 
authorization, private right and 
concession during a land sell
•  General cases: landowners
•  Overexploited aquifers: 
landowners with RBA approval
 Water right remains attached to land ownership. 
Hence, the acquirer of a previously irrigated 
land obtains the associated water right. Irrigable 
land (land with irrigation rights) in Spain is 
more valuable than non-irrigable land. Where 
land is divided, the acquirer of irrigable land 
without access to a well can request a new access 
and withdrawal right as a public concession.
•  Right to sell a right to extract 
water (withdrawal right)
•  Landowners, with approval by 
RBA (within the basin) or by the 
Ministry (interbasin)
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involve creating a limited purpose local government, known as Special Act District, authorized by the Cal-
ifornia Legislature and devised to respond to specific concerns, such as declining groundwater levels or 
degraded water quality. Finally, under the 1992 Groundwater Management Act (AB 3030) and supported by 
Senate Bill 1938 in 2002, groundwater districts could adopt management plans and take action to improve 
coordinated monitoring, operation, and administration of groundwater basins. Finally, since 2014, SGMA 
provides a comprehensive framework for managing groundwater.
Under SGMA, groundwater management plans in existence prior to January 2015, could be submitted as an 
alternative to a GSPs, pending approval of the State. Moving forward, only the 408 very low and low-priority 
basins not subject to SGMA can pursue voluntary groundwater management plans. Although voluntary in 
nature, such plans can enable a range of groundwater management efforts, from improving supply reliabil-
ity through management and infrastructure (e.g., better conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water) 
to imposing controls on well creation and groundwater extraction.
Alternatives to a GSP could also take the form of a 10-year analysis (an analysis that demonstrates that 
basin has operated within sustainability limits over a period of at least 10 years) or a basin adjudication. An 
adjudication can be described as a process, mediated by a judge, to define the amount of water available to 
each user and can set controls on the creation of new wells, the further extraction of water and its exchange 
between users. In basins that have been adjudicated, groundwater use is subject to the specific court decree 
that has been issued. Court adjudications can cover an entire basin, a portion of a basin, or a group of basins 
(including nonbasin locations between the group of basins).
While some adjudications quantified all allocations within the adjudicated area, other judgments do not 
actually quantify them (Langridge, Brown, et al., 2016). Given the complexity of defining groundwater use 
rights, California has a history of adjudicating groundwater rights, even though the process is almost always 
complex, expensive, and lengthy, with many adjudications taking decades to complete (Ayres et al., 2017; 
Blomquist, 1992; Langridge, Brown, et al., 2016).
Additionally, in California, city and county governments can leverage their “police powers” to implement 
groundwater management ordinances, including the monitoring and regulation of groundwater access and 
withdrawal, mainly through well registration and extraction statements (Babbitt, et al., 2018; Enion, 2013). 
While most ordinances originally focused on preventing out of basin transfers of water, more recently, 
counties have leveraged their authorities in an attempt to control groundwater use through limitations 
of well permits. For example, Sierra County in northern California put in place a permitting process for 
groundwater in 1997, and Ventura County and the City of Ojai, on the southern California coast, established 
ordinances prohibiting the issuance of permits for new water wells in unincorporated Ventura County in 
2014 (Langridge, Sepaniak, & Conrad, 2016). It is not entirely clear the extent to which city and county 
governments can or will regulate groundwater in the future considering the passage of SGMA (Babbitt 
et  al.,  2018). In California, although no state-wide water market exists, water trading has long been an 
important water management tool (Hanak et al., 2016). In several of California’s adjudicated basins, where 
water rights and priorities are defined, groundwater markets have also emerged. For example, the Mojave 
Basin Area adjudication allows for the temporary or permanent transfer of groundwater rights (known as 
an overlying landowner’s base annual production right) (Mojave Water Agency,  2021). As groundwater 
basins work to achieve groundwater sustainability goals under SGMA, many basins facing overdraft condi-
tions will need to consider ways to reduce the amount of groundwater pumped (e.g., demand management 
strategies) in addition to supply augmentation strategies (Jezdimirovic et al., 2020).
SGMA affords GSAs the authority to authorize temporary and permanent transfers of groundwater extrac-
tion allocations within their boundaries and several GSAs are considering setting up water trading pro-
grams that will allow landowners to market their groundwater allocations. GSAs are also exploring how 
crediting programs can help incentivize actions to recover groundwater levels, such as the permanent or 
temporary fallowing of land, on-farm recharge, private banking, and conversion to lower water-use crops 
(Babbitt et al., 2018). The Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency’s groundwater trading program 
in Ventura County (Heard et al., 2019), and the Rosedale-Rio Bravo water trading program in California’s 





Table  5 presents the procedures and requirements adopted in California around the five groundwater 
“rights.”
5. Discussion
5.1. Who Controls Groundwater Access and Withdrawals Rights?
France, Spain, and California share a common recognition that groundwater itself cannot be held privately. 
However, some notable differences can be observed over the right to access or extract groundwater.
In California and Spain, landowners hold the right to create a well, but, in both cases, permits are required, 
through local authorities in California and RBAs in Spain. These authorities can oppose the creation of a 
well or impose restrictions (e.g., well spacing). In Spain, the right to extract water from a well is further 
limited through the conditions set in concessions or the “registry of private water rights.” In California, 
individual limits on extractions may exist where the groundwater basin has been adjudicated. In the future, 
GSAs in California have the authority to establish on controls on well creation as well as withdrawal per-
mitting regimes.
In contrast, France has adopted a very different approach in its permitting regime. All permits for well cre-
ation and for extracting water are recoverable without compensation by the State. Furthermore, in priority 
basins, the right to extract water is transferred to the agricultural user organization (OUGCs) (up to 15 years 
validity) and individual users are given one-year allowances by the OUGC. In this sense, France presents 
a more radical approach to empowering the user organization, because the right to extract is not held pri-
vately anymore but collectively. The choice of the collective approach means France puts more emphasis 
on social preferences (and social justice) than efficiency, and more emphasis on flexibility than security of 
tenure. This may be related to lower water scarcity than in Spain or California.
These differences can also be partly explained from legal traditions. France has affirmed, in its 1992 Water 
Law, that groundwater is part of the common heritage of the nation, reinforcing the notion that water is 
held collectively. This has generally justified a shift toward watering down individual appropriative claims, 
as exemplified with the collective licensing of OUGCs and the use of annual allowances. By contrast, in 
their attempt to reach sustainability objectives, Spain and California have encouraged the definition of clear 
individual use rights. In Spain, groundwater users obtained non revocable, long term concessions (50 years) 
or perpetual private rights. In California, cases of adjudication led to the definition of individual rights to 
pump based on land ownership and historical use.
5.2. What Role for the State and Users’ Organizations?
In the three cases, the State retains power concerning the identification and delineation of priority ground-
water basins where extraction needs to be further regulated and water users’ organizations must be estab-
lished. However, the comparison of the institutional arrangements developed in the three case studies to 
support comanagement clearly show that authority over the design and implementation of rules on how 
groundwater can be accessed and extracted can be shared between the State and users in very different ways 
(Table 6).
Concerning the definition of sustainable extraction limits, users’ organizations are left with little room for 
manoeuvre in France and Spain. The State plays a key role in defining minimum groundwater level thresh-
olds that should be maintained to ensure long term sustainability of aquifers and dependent ecosystems. 
In both countries, the State also imposes how sustainability should be reached, by setting restrictions on 
water use, based on the definition of volumetric extraction caps from the aquifer to individual user level. 
By contrast, California has adopted a more decentralized approach where users organization (GSAs) have 
more freedom to define targets for groundwater levels as long as they can demonstrate that they take the 
necessary measures to meet SGMA sustainability objectives. Until now, volumetric caps and individual 
allocations have not been considered by most GSAs (Jezdimirovic et al., 2020), despite several existing in 








Type of right Nature of right Owner of right Description
Access right •  Permits are required to build, 
modify, or deconstruct a well in 
California
•  Landowners •  Counties have authority over well drilling 
permitting, well abandonment standards, and 
related health and safety concerns
•  GSAs can adopt rules and regulations on the 
creation wells (e.g. spacing requirements)
Withdrawal right •  There is no state permit system 
for withdrawing groundwater 
and landowners are generally not 
required to obtain a permit
•  Landowners Exceptions include:
•  SGMA—gives GSAs the authority to establish 
groundwater withdraw permitting regimes but does 
not require that they do so
•  In certain instances, counties have leveraged their 
authorities in an attempt to control groundwater 
use through limitations of well permits
•  In an adjudication, courts define who the water 
right owners are and how much those rights 
holders can extract.
Management right •  Depending on the specific 
circumstances, varying authorities 
and laws can afford authority 
to design withdrawal rules and 
ensure compliance.
•  Depending on areas, local county, 
water agency or GSA, watermaster 
(under court order),
•  SGMA enables GSAs to adopt a wide range of 
measures to achieve sustainability goals, including 
measurement and reporting requirements, 
imposition of fees on groundwater extraction, 
enforcement and sanctions. State intervention 
is possible if locals are unable or unwilling to 
sustainably manage their basin.
•  County—The extent to which counties can or will 
regulate groundwater in the future is an open 
question in light of SGMA. If county groundwater 
ordinances conflict with management under 
SGMA, resolution of conflicts between GSAs and 
corresponding counties may be warranted.
•  The Groundwater Management Act enables very 
low and low priority basins to voluntarily adopt 
Groundwater Management Plans to manage some 
aspects of groundwater
•  Court adjudication—In basins that have been 
adjudicated, groundwater use is subject to 
the specific court decree that has been issued. 
The court typically appoints a watermaster to 
administer the court's decree.
Exclusion right •  Depending on the specific 
circumstances, varying authorities 
determine who can access 
groundwater resources
•  Depending on areas, local county, 
watermaster (under court order), 
GSA
•  GSA—have the authority to limit or suspend 
groundwater extractions but cannot determine or 
alter groundwater use rights.
•  Counties have direct land use authorities pursuant 
to their general police powers. In areas of critical 
overdraft, under certain conditions, counties could 
prohibit development without a demonstrable and 
sustainable water supply or adopt ordinances that 
coincide with and compliment the GSA’s allocation 
authorities under SGMA
•  In an adjudication, courts have the authority to 
define priorities and allocations among water users, 
including who the water right owners are and how 
much groundwater those rights owners can extract.
Table 5 
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Regarding decisions on allocations and reallocations in priority basins, a top-down approach prevails in 
Spain as most decisions are taken by RBAs based on claims from existing and prospective users. User or-
ganizations (GWUAs) cannot directly modify pre-existing concessions, but RBAs can revise concessions, 
for instance when a user repeatedly does not use its full allocation (i.e., use-it-or-loose-it). During droughts, 
restrictions usually apply proportionally to all users. This is in contrast with France who has opted for a 
decentralized approach, in which local user organizations (OUGCs) are entrusted with the responsibility to 
define locally negotiated collective rules to apportion the available resource among their members. Thus, 
each OUGC have its own set of rules to allocate water between recognized users. OUGCs also choose the 
criteria determining which new members can be admitted as well as rules for reallocating the resource 
among members.
In California, adjudications in courts were in most cases merely a means to validate locally negotiated 
agreements (Langridge, Brown, et al., 2016). A watermaster is then typically appointed to adjudicated ba-
sins, and has a role in apportioning the water available in any specific year based on the defined adjudicated 
rights of use. Building on experience from water districts, most GSAs plan to use a combination of water 
imports, replenishment, and economic instruments (e.g., extraction fees, crediting programmes) to influ-
ence more indirectly allocations between appropriators (Jezdimirovic et al., 2020).
Last but not least, significant differences are observed concerning compliance and enforcement. In Spain 
and California, user organizations are enthrusted with the authority to control and sanction non-complying 
users, while the State in France has kept that authority, and the user organization (OUGC) is only involved 
in monitoring groundwater extraction by users.
The difference in approach regarding state and local control between California, France, and Spain is likely 
due to a combination of cultural, political and historical factors. For instance, California has an unique 
historical commitment to local control in an effort to keep groundwater out of state control, as opposed to 
surface water (Dennis et al., 2020). Thus, prior to 2014, the State has limited its support for groundwater 
management to providing scientific and technical assistance, granting powers for local action, and facilitat-
ing groundwater management planning. With SGMA, it has moved from enabling and incentivizing local 
groundwater management, to a position of “mandating” local action (Dennis et al., 2020).
In France and Spain, by contrast, the State has traditionally a strong regulatory role and a legal commitment 
to manage water resources according to EU WFD environmental objectives. The establishment of user or-
ganizations to “co-manage” groundwater overexploitation is the result of a gradual process of involving us-
ers in water management decisions, that started in the 1960s notably with the establishment of stakeholder 
committees in river basin organizations.
5.3. The Risk of Regulatory Capture and the Need for “Credible Threats”
Comanagement should go beyond mere consultation and participation of stakeholders, moving up Arstein’s 






Type of right Nature of right Owner of right Description
Alienation right •  Depending on the specific 
circumstances, varying authorities 
can determine right to sell, lease 
and transfer rights to extract 
groundwater.
•  Landowner •  GSAs have the authority to authorize (or restrict) 
temporary and permanent transfers of groundwater 
extraction allocations within their boundaries
•  Counties have become concerned with potential 
mining of groundwater resources and have enacted 
ordinances prohibiting or conditioning exportation 
of groundwater from the county in which it was 
pumped. Some have even gone so far as limiting 
movement of groundwater from one subbasin to 
another within the county (Babbitt et al., 2018).
•  Court adjudications can allow for the temporary or 
permanent transfer of groundwater rights
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nonstate actors. For many scholars, it is about empowering users and community groups to “self-regulate,” 
for instance by devolving policing powers to local groups (Ostrom, 1990; Molle & Closas, 2020a; Wester 
et al, 2011). In this sense, California and Spain have gone further than France, empowering groundwater 
user groups to monitor and impose sanctions on its users. In France, the state has kept these powers.
However, comanagement entails risks. One such risk is that users cannot agree on the sharing of the burden 
in reducing over-extraction or only agree on sub-optimal outcomes in particular regarding environmental 
effectiveness and social justice (Schlager, 2007). In France, OUGCs have usually rolled in pre-existing indi-
vidual extraction permits into the initial OUGC allocation plan, in a form of prior-appropriation, and many 
opted for less ambitious reallocation rules (Rouillard & Rinaudo, 2020). With its long adjudication processes 
(often decades), California has shown the difficulty for groundwater users to agree on an allocation formula 
(Blomquist, 1992). Negotiated outcomes have often been at the expense of environmental uses and have 
favored large groundwater users over smaller ones and disadvantaged communities (Langridge, Brown, 
et al., 2016). GSAs are also at risk of such power imbalance (Méndez-Barrientos et al., 2020).
To mitigate these risks, scholars have argued for institutional checks and balances on e.g. policy formula-
tion, interpretation of the rules, adjudication and enforcement. If users are involved in the definition of 
spatial and temporal extraction caps (i.e., management rights) but fail to agree on, or implement, ambitious 
caps, then “credible threats” are needed from higher authorities to ensure users adopt measures leading to 
sustainable outcomes (Molle & Closas, 2020a). Higher level jurisdictions may provide support to accompa-
ny the negotiation and mediate conflicts (Moran et al., 2019) or may intervene to impose more ambitious 
measures.
In the three cases, authorities have adopted regulatory tools to intervene in the most over appropriated 
groundwater basins, which suggest a commitment to tackle the most problematic cases. In France, au-
thorities can intervene if OUGCs do not agree on an allocation formula or an appropriate ramp down of 
individual allocations to reach extraction caps. In Spain, authorities can intervene to impose an allocation 
plan in overexploited aquifers. SGMA has introduced the possibility for the Californian authorities to step 
in to protect groundwater resources when the proposed groundwater sustainability plan is unlikely to lead 
to meeting SGMA objectives.
While recent years have seen much activity with setting up new institutions to meet WFD objectives (in 




Type of decisions France Spain California
Establishment of users’ organization 
in priority basins
Imposed by the State Imposed by the State (RBA)  Imposed by the State
Definition of sustainable extraction 
limits
State, based on EU WFD 
requirements and stakeholder 
consultation
State (RBA), based on EU WFD 
requirements and on stakeholder 
consultation
 User organizations (GSA), based 
on SGMA objectives
 Court in case of adjudications
Allocation of water to users User organization (OUGC), validated 
by State
State (RBA), based on concessions 
and private rights
 User organization (GSA)
 Court in case of adjudications 
(judiciary)
Long term reallocation (e.g., between 
existing users, new entrants)
User organization (OUGC), validated 
by State
State, based on consultation with 
user organization (GWUA)
 User organization (GSA)
 Court in case of adjudication
 Water districts, through 
replenishment programs and 
economic instruments
Compliance and enforcement State, based on monitoring by State 
and user organization (OUGC)
User organizations (minor 
infractions) and State (major 
infractions)
 User organizations (GSA) and 
State (as backstop)
 Court in case of adjudications
 Water district through 
replenishment programs and 
economic instruments
Table 6 
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Water Resources Research
to the full implementation of, and compliance to, sustainability standards enshrined in the legislations. The 
capacity and willingness of the State to enforce environmental standards is fragile to changes in political 
and economic conditions. There is also the risk of “regulatory capture” which is a situation where the rela-
tionship between the regulator and the regulated is too close and threatens the environmental effectiveness 
and the fairness of negotiated outcomes (Lopez-Gunn & Cortina, 2006). In France, the setting of volumetric 
extraction caps is an outcome of a participative process, which has so far resulted in generous user alloca-
tions at the expense of meeting environmental requirements (Arnaud, 2020; Rouillard & Rinaudo, 2020).
In Spain, the experience has proved that an allocation plan is not always sufficient, as enforcement can be 
an issue. The threat of taking actions by imposing a more restrictive allocation plan has worked in certain 
places (e.g., Eastern Mancha) by encouraging local actors to adopt stronger control on water use. However, 
when users oppose any mediation or compromise, regulatory bodies need to impose credible threats of 
sanctions and groundwater access limitations, as in the case of Western Mancha. Closas et al. (2017) analyze 
several particularities of this system organization that help to explain the failure of collective action and the 
poor co-management, such as a large aquifer size and a large number of users, the politization and lobbies 
within the farmer organization, and policies lacking ambition.
Ultimately, the effectiveness of comanagement will rest on the commitment of the State to enforce sus-
tainable solutions, but also on the legitimacy of management decisions and their adaptation to local cir-
cumstances, and on users supporting the new environmental standards. This underlines the importance 
of establishing not only institutional checks and balance across governance levels (e.g., through credible 
regulatory threats), but also processes of trust building and social learning between state actors and users to 
ensure a common understanding of the need to regulate water use and how to do so.
6. Conclusions
The paper has examined the definition, exercise and sharing of groundwater rights in France, Spain, and 
California, and shed light on the differing institutional mechanisms influencing the allocation of groundwa-
ter between agricultural users. The three cases show an evolution toward greater oversight over operational 
rights of accessing and withdrawing groundwater, and greater collective management between authorities 
and groundwater users. Overall, the State in France, Spain, and California share a similar overarching role: 
it delineates priority groundwater basins, imposes the establishment of user organizations, and may inter-
vene if sustainability objectives are not met. France and Spain maintain a stronger role in setting the overall 
allocation framework, by regulating water use through public permitting regimes and defining sustainable 
extraction caps. However, France transfers more responsibilities to users organizations when it comes to 
define who legitimate users are and how much water they should be entitled to receive, while Spain and 
California grants more authority to user organizations in compliance and enforcement. Each case will face 
unique challenges when implementing comanagement. For instance, French user organization may find 
their legitimacy compromised due to a lack of authority over noncomplying users. By contrast, Californian 
authorities may face significant challenges in intervening on noncomplying GSAs. As the implementation 
of the EU WFD in Spain and France and SGMA in California advances, future work should assess more 
closely the performance of each of these unique comanagement arrangements.
Data Availability Statement
The qualitative data used in this article is presented in the tables included in the article.
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